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Abstract
This paper examines how actors in the UK electricity sector are attempting to deliver investment
in low carbon generation. Low carbon technologies, because of their relative immaturity, capital
intensity and low operational costs, do not readily fit with existing electricity markets and
investment templates which were designed for fossil fuel based energy. We analyse key
electricity market and infrastructure policies in the UK and highlight how these are aimed at
making low carbon technologies ‘investable’ by reducing uncertainty, managing investment risks
and repositioning actors within the electricity socio-technical ‘regime’. We argue that our study
can inform contemporary debates on the politics and governance of sustainability transitions by
empirically investigating the agency of incumbent regime actors in the face of uncertainty and by
offering critical insights on the role of markets and finance in shaping socio-technical change.
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Introduction
An important feature of electricity systems is their capital intensity. Infrastructure assets,
whether this is electricity generators, transmission lines or transformers, require signiﬁcant
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upfront capital investment, the returns from which typically stretch out over many decades.
The creation of certainty about long-term economic returns from infrastructure investment
has strongly inﬂuenced how this sector is governed, and this has been achieved in diﬀerent
ways through the history of modern integrated electricity systems. In the US, for example,
privately owned utility companies were granted monopoly rights to supply a deﬁned
geographic area, on the basis that their revenues would be tightly controlled by a public
regulator, or rate commission (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998; Hughes, 1983). In many
European countries, such as the UK, investments of state-owned energy companies were
underwritten by national governments (Chick, 2008). In both cases, certainty was created
through strong government control (either ownership or regulation) and a vertically
integrated industry structure which allowed utilities to plan investments on the basis of
relatively predictable demand for electricity in their areas. The primary governance aim
was creating institutional structures to ensure security of supply – in the case of electricity
systems, literally ‘keeping the lights on’.
The introduction of competitive markets for electricity since the 1980s has fundamentally
altered these relationships between governments, consumers, utilities and other private
investors. In the UK utilities now compete for customers and a key role of the markets is
to incentivise private investment on the basis of price signals. Underpinning the design of
electricity markets in the UK was the idea that customer protection from monopoly power
and the delivery of cost eﬃciencies across the industry would be best achieved through
competitive forces (Helm, 2003). Since the early 2000s, a third objective of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions has increasingly been pursued in the UK. 2008 saw the
introduction the Climate Change Act which set a legally binding target of 80% reduction
in emissions by 2050 from 1990 levels. This gives rise to new uncertainties about the role of
governments and markets in delivering electricity infrastructure investment in line with
public policy objectives of reducing emissions, whilst maintaining security of supply and
ensuring aﬀordability of energy services – the so-called ‘energy trilemma’ (Boston, 2013).
This paper examines how, in the UK liberalised context, these new uncertainties are
framed and acted upon by government and market actors. The empirical study
investigates UK government initiatives to reconﬁgure electricity markets to create
investment certainty for centralised low carbon electricity technologies – notably in
‘mature’ technologies such as nuclear, biomass conversion and onshore wind, but also less
mature forms of generation such as oﬀshore wind and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
An important ambition of these initiatives has been to attract ﬁnance from institutional
investors such as pension funds who have not traditionally been involved in direct
ﬁnancing of electricity generation, thus potentially altering the established relationships
between government, energy utilities and investors which has characterised the liberalised
electricity ‘regime’ in the UK. The rationale for this low carbon investment orientated
strategy is that it will reduce the UK’s exposure to volatility in global fossil fuel markets
and give certainty to investors that the UK is committed to a low carbon pathway, thus
reducing the cost of capital of large infrastructure investment.
We critically analyse this process by relating insights on risk and uncertainty to the
literature on sustainability transitions which analyses structural changes to resource
intensive socio-technical systems necessary for key societal services like electricity, heating,
shelter and transport (Steward, 2012). This body of literature has been criticised for adopting
a ‘niche-bias’ which over-emphasises the role of disruptive innovations and bottom-up
change processes, and views incumbent actors as largely static and resistive to change
(Smith et al., 2005; Winskel and Radcliﬀe, 2014). Through our empirical study we seek to
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provide new insights on how eﬀorts to achieve sustainability transitions are being shaped by
incumbent regime actors embedded in existing markets and systems through their eﬀorts to
create certainty in relation to large infrastructure investment programmes. We provide an
understanding of the emerging relationships between policy, investment and electricity
markets, and by illustrating new mechanisms for investment risk allocation between
public and private actors we pose critical questions for research on the politics of
governance of sustainability transitions.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section (‘Socio-technical regimes and
investment uncertainty’), we outline the theoretical framing of the paper. We begin by
summarising recent debates in the sustainability transitions literature. We then introduce
relevant literature on the topic of uncertainty and discuss how this can inform an
understanding of socio-technical systems and investment uncertainty. Section 3 (‘Creating
low carbon investment opportunities in the UK’) contains the empirical core of the paper
which describes how government and market actors in the UK are aligning around new
electricity investment strategies. This is based on a series of interviews with investor and
energy policy actors and an analysis of key documents. In the ﬁnal section (‘Discussion and
Conclusions’), we discuss our empirical ﬁndings in relation to wider debates about governing
sustainability transitions.
Socio-technical regimes and investment uncertainty
The dynamics of socio-technical regimes
Socio-technical regimes, as deﬁned below, form the ‘focal unit of analysis’ (Smith et al.,
2005) in transition studies:
The socio-technical regime forms the ‘deep structure’ that accounts for the stability of an existing
socio-technical system. . .It refers to the semi-coherent set of rules that orient and coordinate the
activities of the social groups that reproduce the various elements of socio-technical systems.
(Geels, 2011: 27)
Regimes in this sense are ‘meso-level’ socio-technical aggregates which underpin the delivery
of key societal functions such as electricity and transport. ‘Regime shifts’, or transitions, are
not analysed in terms of a single technology or actor, rather the ‘change from one socio-
technical conﬁguration to another’ (Geels, 2002).
There is a stylised account of transitions in the literature which is based on the multi-level
perspective of meso level regimes, micro level niches and an external macro level landscape.
Transitions have been generally viewed as emergent, unpredictable innovation processes –
radical innovations emerge from niches, which are protected and removed from the
structural constraints of incumbent regimes. Given the right ‘landscape’ conditions, e.g. a
ﬁnancial crisis or unexpected disruption, the stability of regime structures are compromised
and niche innovations can grow to eventually overthrow the incumbent regime whose
capacity to adapt is constrained by a commitment to outdated business models and
technologies (Hoogma et al., 2002; Kemp et al., 1998).
However a number of recent studies have argued for a more in-depth analysis of regime
processes and how the political dynamics between diﬀerent actors in a regime give rise to
stability or incremental change, whilst blocking more radical change (e.g. Geels, 2014;
Karltorp and Sande´n, 2012; Meadowcroft, 2009; Ottosson and Magnusson, 2013; Smink
et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2005; Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008; Turnheim and Geels, 2013;
Winskel and Radcliﬀe, 2014). For example, Geels (2014) analyses collective action on the
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part of UK electricity regime actors including ‘policymakers and incumbent business actors
[who] tend to form close alliances because of mutual dependencies’ (p. 26). He illustrates how,
as a collective block, regime actors formulate resistance strategies to disruptive innovations by
mobilising ‘instrumental, discursive, material and institutional forms of power’ (p. 3). Earlier
work by Smith et al. (2005) points to three key factors which inﬂuence the ability of regimes to
maintain control over transition processes: How ‘selection pressures’ are articulated by regime
members, whether regime members possess the resources and capacities necessary for
transformation, and ﬁnally the extent to which regime responses are coordinated and
coherent. They argue that the ability of a regime to respond to changing selection pressures,
its adaptive capacity, is ‘a function of the availability of resources and how they are
coordinated’ (p. 1492). Regimes with a high adaptive capacity are well resourced and
respond in a highly coordinated manner to selection pressures.
It has been highlighted elsewhere that infrastructure investment is a key source of ‘lock-in’ of
socio-technical systems (Unruh, 2000). Closing down uncertainty in relation to investment
decisions is a key mechanism by which regime actors maintain their dominant position.
However, the topic of investment and uncertainty has not been explicitly discussed in depth in
the transitions literature. Below we introduce some relevant concepts and strands of thinking on
the issue of uncertainty as it relates to markets and investment.1 Following this we discuss how
these insights can be drawn upon to inform our analysis of UK electricity.
Investment and uncertainty
An important starting point in this discussion is the distinction between uncertainty and risk
initially made by the economist Frank Knight (Knight, 1921). Risk refers to situations
where, although the future outcome is unknown, it is possible to calculate probabilities
based on information and knowledge from past experience. Uncertainty, on the other
hand, refers to situations where there is inadequate information or capacity to assess
likely outcomes. In situations of uncertainty, previous experience cannot be relied upon.
Economic sociologists have stressed the importance of institutional change and the state
in managing complexity and uncertainty in markets. The literature on the sociology of
markets emphasises the role of institutional adaptation in transforming unknowable
uncertainty into measurable and manageable risk. Beckert (1996) is concerned with the
ways in which actors ‘reduce the complexity they confront in decision-making processes’
(p. 825), and refers to ‘social devices’ for reducing uncertainty such as social networks and
organisational routines which breed familiarity and provide structure to economic exchange.
Fligstein (2001) argues that during periods of market transformation and uncertainty,
incumbent market actors often prove ‘incapable of providing rules for themselves
[and]. . .in the face of uncertainty and diﬃcult competition, ﬁrms ﬁnd it impossible to
solve their collective problems of competition’ (pp. 27, 28). Government interventions in
the form of deﬁning property rights, rules of exchange and governance structures create
certainty and stability in markets and hence form the basis of socio-technical regimes.
The relationship between uncertainty and institutional transformation is also of concern
to institutional economists who argue that the origins of hierarchical governance structures
lie in eﬀorts to manage risks and uncertainties associated with eﬀectively organising
economic activity in complex markets (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Institutional
economists emphasise the importance of hybrid forms of economic organisation which
facilitate information exchange and reduce uncertainty in economic processes. These are
situated along the continuum between pure hierarchy and markets, examples include
vertical integration in industries, joint ventures and contracts.
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Delivering low carbon investment through uncertainty reduction and risk management
This discussion of uncertainty suggests that regime capacity to reduce uncertainty by
exerting control over investment is strongly inﬂuenced by incumbent actors’ collective
eﬀorts to manage risks through institutional changes which aﬀect the operation of
markets and regulatory frameworks. During periods of uncertainty government
intervention is more likely to be required to create the necessary certainty and investment
conditions. The speciﬁc challenge facing incumbent actors in the UK electricity regime is
that low carbon generation technologies, particularly renewables and nuclear power, have
diﬀerent characteristics to conventional fossil fuel based electricity generation technologies.
They have higher capital costs but lower running, or marginal, costs (primarily the cost of
fuel). This means that they are less compatible with electricity markets designed for
conventional technologies. The policy-orientated literature on low carbon investment
discusses a range of investment risks which, although common across all technologies,
tend to be accentuated for low carbon (Hamilton, 2009, PWC, 2010; Sullivan, 2011,
Waissbein et al., 2013). These include:
. The risk of cost overruns at the construction stage of a project;
. Operational and technology risks such as the durability of the technology in extreme
weather conditions, unforeseen maintenance costs, the reliability of wind, solar
resources and other feed stocks or the availability of a reliable grid connection;
. Financing risks such as the availability of reliable sources capital at acceptable rates of
return;
. Market risks such as variations in electricity wholesale prices, carbon price or the volume
of generation required to meet demand;
. Policy or regulatory risks, associated with changes in levels or forms of support available
for investment in new generation.
In the following section (‘Creating low carbon investment opportunities in the UK’), we
will discuss how institutional changes are aiming to manage and allocate these risks so that
they are calculable and acceptable for diﬀerent types of investor and ﬁt with the established
investment templates for large scale infrastructure investments. We observe that there is a
potential repositioning of actors taking place within the UK electricity regime where,
enabled by government interventions to manage risks and create certainty, institutional
investors take a more active role in ﬁnancing low carbon generation investments.
We discuss how a key motivation behind recent government initiatives – Infrastructure
UK (IUK) and the Green Investment Bank (GIB) – has been to improve communication
and build trust with prospective investors. This relates to Beckert’s insights on the role of
new ‘social devices’ in reducing uncertainty. First, we discuss recent government proposals
for Electricity Market Reform (EMR) which aim to reduce price uncertainty for investors to
managed price risk. This brings to the fore Fligstein’s insights and those of institutional
economists on the role of government intervention and hierarchy in providing stability in
markets during periods of uncertainty.
Creating low carbon investment opportunities in the UK
Methods
The primary source of our empirical study is a series of in depth semi-structured interviews
with individuals in the investment and energy policy communities in the UK. Fifteen
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interviews were conducted during 2013 (see Appendix), three were with employees of
incumbent energy utilities, ﬁve with investment professionals (either fund managers or
advisers of pension funds and insurance companies), three with individuals who invest in
small scale decentralised technologies, one non-governmental organization professional
campaigning for more sustainable pensions investment practices, one with a CEO of an
investment industry body which promotes sustainable and low carbon investment, and
two with oﬃcials in key energy focused government agencies who regularly interact with
investors.
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour and focused on the nature of interactions
between government and investors in relation to EMR, IUK and the formation of a public
GIB. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and manually coded according to key
emerging themes. Below we discuss on speciﬁc energy and infrastructure policy areas
which were highlighted by interviewees as particularly pertinent to the maintenance of
centralised electricity supply in a low carbon future.
Getting the prices right – Addressing uncertainty in the electricity market
In this section, we discuss how concerns about investment uncertainty have become
increasingly central to mainstream energy policy debates in relation to the restructuring of
electricity markets.
The UK pioneered the development of liberalised electricity markets in the 1990s with the
initial creation of a wholesale market for electricity generation in 1990 and the subsequent
introduction of retail electricity markets for commercial and domestic customers.
Underpinning this was a view that the previous model of state directed and ﬁnanced
investment was ineﬃcient, leading to higher costs for consumers, and that private
investors are best placed to make ‘optimal’ investment decisions (Bolton and Foxon,
2013; Mitchell, 2008). However, since 2010 the UK government have been consulting on
and implementing a process of EMR, characterised by signiﬁcant government intervention
designed to stimulate investment in low carbon and balancing generation (including all
renewables, nuclear and CCS, and new gas plant) for environmental and security of
supply reasons.
The electricity market in the UK, now known as BETTA,2 operates on a rolling half-hour
basis where the vast majority of trading is conducted bilaterally between suppliers (retail
companies who sell to customers) and generators. Suppliers are incentivised to procure
adequate volumes to meet their demand for each trading period and generators face
penalties if they do not input the agreed amount of power into the grid. A key challenge
for these companies is to procure adequate volumes of power to serve demand, but not to
oversupply. Partly in order to overcome these risks the large energy companies in the UK
have adopted vertically integrated corporate structures and as a result the market is now
dominated by six large utilities who both generate and sell power to customers – the ‘big six’.
An unintended consequence of the liberalised market structure was that investment in
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants became the investment of choice. During the
1990s the UK underwent a ‘dash for gas’ when gas consumption for electricity generation
increased rapidly3 following the dismantling of the state owned utilities (Bolton and Foxon,
2015; Kern, 2012; Winskel, 2002). This was due to the lower capital costs of CCGTs relative
to alternatives, their ﬂexibility in an increasingly dynamic market and the availably of secure
and relatively cheap sources of gas from the North Sea at the time. In recent years, there has
been a relative hiatus in gas plant investments, in part due to the availability of cheap coal
imports from the USA. However, since liberalisation, investment in CCGT capacity has
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signiﬁcantly outpaced all other forms of generation. While CCGT is a lower carbon option
than coal, it is generally accepted that if the UK is to meet its climate and renewable
objectives, by the 2030s, unabated CCGT can only be used to provide ﬂexible peaking
plant at times of low wind (CCC, 2010).
This raises challenges for the ﬁnancing of investment in new gas generation, which
intersect with those for ﬁnancing new renewable, nuclear and CCS generation. In the
current situation, gas generators are able to hedge a signiﬁcant degree of fuel price risk,
as ﬂuctuations in the costs of gas can be passed on to ﬁnal customers. This is not the case for
higher capital cost low carbon generators, whose costs are more associated with the one oﬀ
initial capital investments rather than ongoing fuel costs; they therefore require a greater
degree of certainty over long-term electricity prices to make an adequate return (for a more
detailed discussion, see Gross et al., 2007). Investors are therefore more exposed to the risk
of changes in wholesale electricity prices in the future. At the same time, gas generators often
derive a signiﬁcant proportion of their revenue from providing capacity during periods of
peak load, or when intermittent wind or solar are scarce (Gross et al., 2010), (Carstairs and
Pope, 2011; Zachmann, 2007). This controllable peaking plant, particularly gas, is currently
key to balancing systems with high degrees of intermittent generation (Heide et al., 2011;
Rasmussen et al., 2012). However, during periods when renewable generation becomes
cheap at the margin, e.g. at times of high wind, renewables are increasingly replacing gas
‘peaking plant’, which may make it uneconomic for investors to invest in new gas generation
assets, thus endangering security of supply (Channell et al., 2013; Redpoint, 2010).
A key motivation behind the UK government’s EMR, introduced as part of the 2013
Energy Act, has been to address these new complexities and uncertainties, in order to give
investors conﬁdence in the returns they will realise from investment in both low carbon
(renewables, CCS and nuclear), and peaking/balancing assets (primarily gas) (DECC,
2012; Redpoint, 2010). The central elements of EMR are contracts for diﬀerence (CfD)
feed-in tariﬀs, supporting low carbon investment, and a capacity market, aiming to ensure
security of supply.4 The capacity market works by giving selected capacity providers (e.g.
generators, storage or demand side management) a steady payment to ensure enough
capacity is in place to meet demand at peak periods (DECC, 2013). These payments are
additional to those which generators can secure in the wholesale market and therefore place
a premium on controllable generation, in theory incentivising investment in new CCGT
peaking plant. The CfD feed-in tariﬀs support new low carbon generation by oﬀering a
ﬁxed ‘strike price’, which diﬀers for low carbon generation technologies. This consistent
strike price, contracted for at least 15 years, is compared to the average annual wholesale
price set by the market (a ﬂuctuating reference price). Low carbon generators who have
entered into a contract will receive the market price for their electricity plus a top up – the
diﬀerence between the strike price and the market price – and in theory will have more
certainty over long-term electricity prices. This should therefore stimulate greater investment
in all forms of new low carbon generation, though, arguably, the design of CfD scheme was
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the UK government’s desire to create a support mechanism for
new nuclear power, as well as for new large-scale renewable generation.5 The background to
the introduction of the CfD market device was a critique of the previous renewables
certiﬁcate trading scheme called the renewables obligation (RO).6 This model was
criticised on the basis that it created additional risks in the market as oppose to a
German style ﬁxed feed in tariﬀ scheme which oﬀers a consistent price for a ﬁxed period
and is decoupled from the market (Mitchell et al., 2006; Woodman and Mitchell, 2011).
These EMR mechanisms are controversial in relation to their implications for technology
outcomes and governance processes. For example, a contentious aspect of the new capacity
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market is that payments may extend the economic life of fossil fuel generators, particularly
coal and gas plant that may otherwise be shut down. A number of critical assessments have
been made of this on that basis that incumbent technologies will beneﬁt as the majority of
the payments will go to existing coal, gas and nuclear plants,7 with a relatively minor
proportion in terms of capacity going to more innovative solutions such as storage (6%)
and demand side response (1%) (Evans, 2015; Mitchell, 2014). Also, in relation to CfD
contracts, the move away from market led investment and towards long-term contracts
has been questioned by some. For example Bunn and Yusupov (2015), based on
modelling, suggest that as increasing amounts of renewables compete for market share,
the certainty provided under the RO scheme in terms of output may outweigh the beneﬁts
of CfDs in terms of mitigating market price risk. Another issue that has been raised has been
long-term uncertainty about the pool of money allocated to pay for the CfDs. This is to be
paid out of a levy on customer bills – the levy control framework (LCF) – which goes to pay
for a range of environmental policies, primarily support for renewables and now other low
carbon technologies. In 2011, the government put a cap on the amount customers contribute
to this levy up to 2020. Some, in particular the oﬀshore wind industry, have criticised the
LCF as it may limit the amount of new low carbon generation that can be supported in this
period, and, as the government has not provided clear indications of the level of support
available further into the 2020s when much of the renewable investment to decarbonise
electricity is likely to take place, there is a degree of uncertainty about the medium and
long-term integrity of the framework itself in the 2020s.
From a more macro perspective, some commentators lament the dismantling of the UK’s
liberalised electricity market model (Keay, 2012; Pollitt and Haney, 2013) which has been
viewed as an exemplar for the move towards the liberalisation of infrastructure sectors
internationally (Thomas, 2006). The following excerpts from two separate interviews
illustrate the fault-lines of contemporary debate around the future of liberalised energy
markets in the UK. The ﬁrst (quote 1), from an employee in the commercial division of a
large UK energy company, illustrates what might be termed as a conventional critique based
on neo-classical economic theory of what is viewed as government interference in the price
setting process. The second (quote 2), from an individual working in an investment
management and advisory ﬁrm, outlines an alternative perspective; here government
intervention is viewed as an inevitable consequence of the need for large scale investment
to meet climate change targets.
Quote 1: If there really is a security of supply question it would be solved by the prices going up
so that you then have the incentives to invest. Actually it kind of links in with the environmental
one. [If] there really is an environmental issue and you tax the environmental damage the prices
will go up to pay for the investment. (Interview 13)
Quote 2: Let’s be clear, what’s happening now under EMR is a substantial renationalisation of the
investment making process in the energy sector. And that’s alright in my view, that’s kind of alright,
I don’t mind that. We have been big fans of the country having a plan. We think this picking winners
argument is just ridiculous. If you want to achieve something in a certain timeframe and it’s clear
where the resource is, it’s clear what are the technologies that can be deployed at scale. . .And this
goes on to your question I suppose of the role of markets and diﬀerent things. Yes markets with their
short termism and their incentives and their focus on cost eﬃciency when you’ve got an
infrastructure you’re trying to sweat. But when you’re trying to build a whole new one that’s
gonna cost you more than the one you have in the ﬁrst place, then you can’t expect the market
to deliver all those investments. Hence in the UK the EMR. (Interview 5)
As these quotes suggest, concerns about investment uncertainty have moved to the core of
contemporary energy governance in the UK. Both CfDs and capacity payments constitute
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state intervention in the functioning of the electricity market, with the intention of reducing
price uncertainty and delivering more predictable returns. In Knightian terms, this means
moving from price uncertainty to calculable price risk. A move away from markets towards
some form long-term contractual arrangement ensuring greater price certainty is perhaps
unsurprising. As noted, institutional economists emphasise how economic actors seek to
reduce uncertainty through such measures (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), highlighting a
continuum between the ideal type governance modes of markets and hierarchy, with various
forms of hybrid modes of economic organisation in between.
Who will invest? Managing risks and engaging with institutional investors
Aside from debates about how best to reconﬁgure electricity markets, there is a concern
about the capacity of the electricity supply industry, namely utility companies, to deliver the
levels of investment required, which UK government estimates in the region of 110 bn in low
carbon electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure by 2020 (DECC,
2012). At the same time, the ﬁnancial crisis has placed pressure on the balance sheets of the
banks and utilities who have historically ﬁnanced electricity investments. A new group of
investors is being looked towards to deliver the signiﬁcant upfront capital required for the
decarbonisation of the UK’s electricity sector, primarily institutional investors such as
pension funds and insurance companies who manage large pools of capital (Nelson and
Pierpont, 2013). However, these investments are perceived as risky by institutional investors
who are unsure about long-term government commitments to the low carbon agenda (EY,
2014). A new energy policy discourse has emerged around the need for a more consistent,
long-term energy and climate policy framework which takes into account the diﬀerent types
of risks these investors face and has measures in place to manage them – sometimes referred
to as ‘investment grade policy’ (Sullivan, 2011).
These actors have historically been important investors in the energy sectors, but more
indirectly as equity owners of corporate utilities. Their potential repositioning as more direct
investors in projects has been forwarded as a means of bridging the ‘ﬁnancing gap’. Unlike
specialist energy utilities, however, institutional investors have less specialist knowledge of
electricity markets and technologies and are more risk averse. Government is therefore being
called upon to reallocate risks and roles within the electricity regime.
Two institutional developments at the UK government level are spearheading this
eﬀort: The ﬁrst is IUK, a unit within the Treasury ‘made up of civil servants and
private sector commercial experts’ which ‘. . .works on the UK’s long-term infrastructure
priorities and secures private sector investment’.8 IUK develops annual National
Infrastructure Plans which set priorities for the diﬀerent economic infrastructure sectors
(communications, transport, waste, water and energy), identiﬁes key infrastructure projects
and monitors their progress, and actively engages and communicates with the investment
community through dedicated investor platforms. The second is the GIB, an initiative
sponsored by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills whose purpose is to
address a perceived ‘market failure’ (Wigley et al., 2010) in the ﬁnancing of green
infrastructure following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008. This crisis adversely aﬀected
the willingness of banks to provide long-term debt for infrastructure investment, thus
undermining the established project ﬁnance models, particularly for non-utility ﬁnanced
renewable generation (interview 12). The GIB was initiated in 2012 with »3.8 billion of
government funding for investment ‘in innovative, environmentally-friendly areas for
which there is currently a lack of suﬃcient support from private markets’
(Infrastructure UK, 2013: 86).
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These initiatives are sponsored by diﬀerent government departments and thus have distinct
functions, for example, IUK looks across the energy, communications, water and transport
sectors and is focused on near term objectives, i.e. accelerating economic growth and job
creation, whereas the GIB has a remit to contribute to the long-term decarbonisation
objective and prioritises speciﬁc energy/environmental investments (oﬀshore wind, energy
eﬃciency and waste). However, they share in common an ambition to improve the
investability of low carbon technologies in the eyes of the investment community.
IUK has created pensions and insurance industry platforms that are emblematic of this
wider UK government eﬀort. The ‘Pensions Infrastructure Platform’ (PIP), for example, ‘has
a 10 year target of raising an additional »20 billion infrastructure investment’ (Rhodes,
2013). A number of signiﬁcant representative bodies of this industry (e.g. National
Association of Pension Funds and Pension Protection Fund) have signed a memorandum
of understanding with the UK government to work towards achieving the 10 year target.
IUK noted in its 2013 Infrastructure Plan that ‘the PIP announced it had raised its ﬁrst »1
billion of committed funds from 10 founding investors’ (Infrastructure UK, 2013: 88). IUK
has setup a similar platform for the insurance industry: the insurers’ Infrastructure
Investment Forum aims ‘to give members of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) a
direct communication link to government’ (p. 88).
Building relationships with key actors in the investment community is an increasingly
important objective for some government departments. In the quotation below from the
head of investor relations in a governmental agency, the interviewee stressed how energy
policy makers and regulators now speciﬁcally incorporate the views of city investors in
policy formulation and are extremely keen to maintain an open dialogue with them.
Our investor relations role as any investor relations role in a company is a basically a two way
communications with the investment community. By the investment community I mean analysts
in the buy side, so that’s the brokers and the investment managers, investors themselves - the
fund managers, portfolio managers, the investment bankers as well, investors in private equity,
credit rating agencies, across the board of what is called the city really [. . .]. We read what is
published, we listen to them, what they say, we attend companies presentations, when they do
presentations for analysts, we attend them ourselves, and pick up on what kinds of questions
that analysts are asking, what responses the companies are giving, we get a feel for what is
happening. (Interview 14)
The interviewee went on to describe how, in these relations between government and
investors, perceptions of uncertainty is a key concern:
. . .the problem with these things is that it only takes a couple of people [to] suddenly publish
something quite negative about our policies, and they’re saying huge uncertainties. . . I think it is
understanding how the city works, understanding how investors work, understanding the
decisions that you make how they are going to aﬀect people and how you say things and
what you don’t say as well. It’s understanding that and also the level of uncertainty that you
put out there for example when you leave something open. (Interview 14)
If institutional investors are to play a more signiﬁcant role in ﬁnancing the low carbon
transition, a key challenge for energy policy is to understand how these actors view the world
diﬀerently from more traditional investors. The traditional utility-based energy ﬁnance model
was underpinned by specialised knowledge of energy technologies and long-term ownership
and operation of assets. Institutional investors, on the other hand, prefer delocalised, highly
tradable or liquid ﬁnancial instruments and do not see their role as long-term infrastructure
owners/operators (Webb, 2014). These actors categorise infrastructure as one of a number of
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‘asset classes’, the others being equities (shares in listed companies), private equity (investments
in smaller non-listed companies), real estate and securities (government and company bonds)
(UBS, 2011). Investors aim to become diversiﬁed across asset classes and allocate a speciﬁc
percentage of their capital to each, depending on their attitude to risk. Infrastructure is viewed
as relatively low risk, one interviewee noted that maturing pension funds are particularly
attracted towards infrastructure investments where returns are predictable and preferably
inﬂation linked (interview 12).
In the quotes below from an investment advisor it was outlined how these investors view
infrastructure as a general class and are concerned with the risk/return ratio from energy
projects relative to other investable infrastructure propositions as part of a global choice set:
We don’t need to invest in infrastructure at all or we can invest in hospitals and schools rather
than wind turbines. We have pretty wide global choices about where we make our investments
and we’ll chase the investments that’ll make the best returns for our customers, and so it really is
a competitive market out there for capital and if the UK is a very confusing uncertain place
where the governing coalition seems to have rather divergent views about the future of energy
policy and there’s questions about commitment to the direction of travel. (Interview 5)
Due to the relatively recent history of infrastructure privatisation in the UK and elsewhere
infrastructure is viewed as an ‘immature asset class unlike real estate or private equity and
therefore the establishment of long term trends in terms of what’s an appropriate return for
the risk is not particularly well established’ (Interview 6). Low carbon, particularly
renewable electricity generation, as a speciﬁc subset of infrastructure, is itself even more
immature and even more reliant on government policy in the form of market support
mechanisms and subsidies. In the words of an investment advisor: ‘If you compare low
carbon infrastructure to other kinds of infrastructure like hospitals or schools. . .I think
there is a perception of greater policy risk’ (Interview 1).
Building trust between government and market actors is viewed as a central role of IUK
and GIB. A core function of GIB, for example, is not only to directly invest in projects
themselves, but to use its initial capitalisation to ‘catalyse private sector investment’
(Kingsbury, CEO).9 It aims to instigate a secondary market where ‘de-risked’ operational
assets are sold on to institutional investors. One interviewee from an investment fund
described it as getting ‘a bunch of projects that are already built, there are predictable
ﬂows of revenues. . . and then issue a bond to ﬁnance their ongoing growth’ (interview 1).
A number of interviewees (1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15) highlighted the need to establish a ‘pipeline’
of such investments to build conﬁdence amongst investors. The role of government agencies
such as the GIB in doing so was highlighted by the following interviewee:
. . .if the government comes along, [. . .]and provides some kind of guarantee around the
construction risk. . .there are other ways potentially to provide the guarantees, then you have
an investment grade BBB type bond which we could invest [in] potentially, a billion, two billion.
(Interview 1)
One illustration of the intermediary role that GIB is playing in the creation of such a market
is an initial investment made by government in Greencoat UK Wind, a company which
consists of operational wind farms initially constructed by a number of large utility
companies. Advised by the GIB, the UK government purchased »50m worth of shares in
Greencoat when it was placed as an initial public oﬀering on the London Stock Exchange in
2013. Greencoat and similar initiatives10 illustrate what many actors view as a potential new
alignment of actors in the electricity regime; specialist energy companies with speciﬁc
expertise in large scale project development take a lead in constructing the plant, e.g. an
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oﬀshore windfarm, and once it is operational and many of the early stage risks which
institutional investors are unwilling to take on are overcome, it is reﬁnanced. This form of
capital recycling, in theory, frees up the balance sheets of utilities to ﬁnance further new
investments, particularly those utilities which had expanded their asset portfolio prior to the
ﬁnancial crisis through debt ﬁnancing. An interviewee from one of the UK’s large utility
companies however expressed nervousness about moving away from the traditional business
and ﬁnancing model:
In the past the reward has been running that station for the next 20-30 years. So you’d have to be
able to get credibility about those returns to take it oﬀ your balance sheet by farming it oﬀ to
someone. . .We in the energy industry are used to working with that and for twenty years at least
it was reasonably stable. I’m not quite sure [where] it is at the moment or where it is headed. That
worries us and it’s probably going to worry external people even more [referring to shareholders
in these companies]. That’s my nervousness at being able to do that. (Interview 13)
IUK and GIB are institutional manifestations of a redeﬁnition of government’s role in
relation to infrastructure investment in key economic sectors and low carbon technologies
(Helm, 2013). Elements of investment risk are to be transferred from the private sector to
energy customers and/or taxpayers, reducing the cost of capital for investors. That this
reduces the overall economic cost to society of an energy transition is cited as a
justiﬁcation for this transfer of risk.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper began by outlining the relationship between electricity system governance and
investment in capital intensive infrastructure. Throughout the history of modern
infrastructure systems the creation of long-term certainty to enable investment in power
plants, transmission lines, etc. has been an important aim of policies and institutions in the
electricity sector, and similar infrastructure sectors such as water supply and public transport.
In recent decades in many industrialised countries such as the UK the dominant organising
principle for these systems has been market led, with the underpinning assumption that
private investors operating on the basis of price signals with minimal government
intervention would lead to ‘optimal’ investment decisions. However, in the context of
climate change new uncertainties about the future trajectory of electricity system change is
prompting institutional responses to the challenge of creating investment certainty.
The market-based electricity regime which emerged following liberalisation reforms in the
UK had been conﬁgured for investment in fossil fuel based generation. However because of
the distinct materiality of low carbon technologies (more capital intensive, relatively
immature and low marginal costs) and the ﬁnancial crisis, the established approach of
ﬁnancing investments from bank debt and corporate utility balance sheets has been
undermined (Hall et al., in press; Hall et al., (2015)). Reforms to the electricity market,
new policy supports and investment vehicles are being introduced with the aim of
channelling new sources of ﬁnance from institutional investors into the electricity sector.
We are seeing the potential repositioning of actors within the electricity regime where utilities
transfer de-risked operational assets to institutional investors who play a more direct role in
terms of ﬁnance and ownership, with government playing a key facilitating role.
Through the lens of transitions theory, these empirical ﬁndings can be seen as a response
of the incumbent socio-technical ‘regime’ to new uncertainties. The study thus contributes to
an understanding of the real world practices of governing sustainability transitions and feeds
into an emerging topic in the literature about incumbent regime agency. Our analysis of UK
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electricity indicates that regime responses are not monolithic and pre-determined. For
example, we observed some reluctance on the part of utility companies who currently
operate much of the asset base to participate in the proposed recalibrated electricity
regime. Also, the process of market reforms and institutional change may itself be a
source of additional risks and uncertainties as policy changes create new complexities.
The politicisation of electricity investment may turn out to be a new source of uncertainty
as the process is increasingly dependent on the long-term commitment of government to the
decarbonisation agenda, which may be undermined as other priorities (energy security and
cost) become more salient.
The analysis also illustrates how certain regime actors frame the low carbon transition
primarily in technological terms with institutional changes seen as necessary to facilitate
investment in large scale infrastructure projects. This means that shared regime assumptions,
such as a focus on increasing electricity supply rather than reducing demand, and stimulating
private sector investment as the main vehicle to achieve this, hold sway.
Through our analysis we have observed how the interests of certain actors (particularly
private investors) are becoming inscribed into the market structures and regulatory
frameworks which allocate investment risks and returns. It may be the case that these
processes will accelerate low carbon investment and enable the UK to achieve its emission
targets, alternatively they may serve to lock-out alternative pathways of change such as
demand reduction through lifestyle change or more decentralised system conﬁgurations
based on civic or community ownership (Hall et al., in press). Placing the analytical focus
on investment and incumbent regimes helps to uncover underlying issues shaping the politics
of energy transitions, for example; the distribution of investment risks and returns of long-
term capital investments, how institutions mediate the balance between private returns and
wider societal beneﬁts from investments, and how market and regulatory reforms limit or
enable participation in socio-technical change.
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Notes
1. There is a wider sociology literature on risk governance not discussed here. See e.g. (Beck, 1992;
O’Malley, 2005).
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2. British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements.
3. On average 2.1GW of CCGT was added to the system annually during the 1991–2000 period
(Kern, 2012).
4. The third policy instrument is an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) which sets a limit of 450
g/kWh for all new fossil fuel plant with the purpose of ensuring that there will be no more
unabated coal plants built in the UK. Also, due to the poor performance of the European
Emissions Trading Scheme, as part of the overall policy package, the UK Treasury will
introduce an artificial floor on the carbon price for electricity generation. As part of the 2011
Finance Act, a carbon price floor is to be introduced in 2013 at approx »15.70/tCO2, rising to »30/
tCO2 in 2020 and »70/tCO2 in 2030. The automatic rise in this carbon floor price was put on hold
in the Government’s 2014 Budget.
5. At the time of writing, the support for the first new nuclear power station to be built at Hinkley
Point C was the subject of a legal challenge by the Austrian government, under EU state aid rules.
6. ‘Britain introduced its green certificate mechanism, the Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs),
in 2002, the market prices of which were determined by the demand and supply of renewable
energy in the wholesale market on an annual basis. Demand was created by an obligation on retail
suppliers to cover a specified fraction, increasing yearly, of their sales with certified green energy;
supply was provided by metered renewable generation (with an administered buy-out supply to
meet any shortfalls)’ (Bunn and Yusupov, 2015).
7. Gas plants – 45%; coal or biomass plants – 19%; nuclear – 16% (Evans, 2015).
8. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/infrastructure-uk/about
9. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/191/130912.htm
10. For more examples, see: http://www.greeninvestmentbank.com/our-investments/
References
Beck U (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage.
Beckert J (1996) What is sociological about economic sociology? Uncertainty and the embeddedness of
economic action. Theory and Society 25: 803–840.
Bolton R and Foxon T (2013) Urban infrastructure dynamics: Market regulation and the shaping of
district energy in UK cities. Environment and Planning A 45: 2194–2211.
Bolton R and Foxon TJ (2015) A socio-technical perspective on low carbon investment challenges –
Insights for UK energy policy. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 41: 165–181.
Boston A (2013) Delivering a secure electricity supply on a low carbon pathway. Energy Policy 52:
55–59.
Bunn D and Yusupov T (2015) The progressive ineﬃciency of replacing renewable obligation
certiﬁcates with contracts-for-diﬀerences in the UK electricity market. Energy Policy 82: 298–309.
Carstairs J and Pope I (2011) The case for a new capacity mechanism in the UK electricity
market—Lessons from Australia and New Zealand. Energy Policy 39: 5096–5098.
Channell J, Jansen HR, Syme AR, et al. (2013) Energy Darwinism: The Evolution of the Energy
Industry. New York, NY: Citi Research.
Chick M (2008) Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the United States since 1945.
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
Coase R (1937) The nature of the ﬁrm. Economica 4: 386–405.
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) (2010) The Fourth Carbon Budget Reducing Emissions Through
the 2020s. London: Committee on Climate Change.
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (2012) Electricity Market Reform: Policy
Overview. London: Department of Energy and Climate Change.
DECC (2013) Electricity Market Reform: Capacity Market – Detailed Design Proposals. London:
Department of Energy and Climate Change.
Evans S (2015) Old coal and gas plants won largest share of capacity market, ﬁnal results conﬁrm. The
carbon brief. Available at: www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/01/old-coal-and-gas-plants-won-
largest-share-of-capacity-market-ﬁnal-results-conﬁrm/ (accessed 15 November 2015).
1400 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 34(8)
EY (2014) Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index. Issue 42. London: Ernst & Young.
Fligstein N (2001) The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century
Capitalist Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Geels FW (2002) Technological transitions as evolutionary reconﬁguration processes: A multi-level
perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31: 1257–1274.
Geels FW (2011) The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to seven
criticisms. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1: 24–40.
Geels FW (2014) Regime resistance against low-carbon transitions: Introducing politics and power
into the multi-level perspective. Theory, Culture & Society 31(5): 21–40.
Granovetter M and McGuire P (1998) The making of an industry: Electricity in the United States. In:
Callon M (ed.) Laws of the Markets. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 147–174.
Gross R, Blyth W and Heptonstall P (2007) Investment in Electricity Generation: The Role of Costs,
Incentives and Risks. London: Imperial College.
Gross R, Blyth W and Heptonstall P (2010) Risks, revenues and investment in electricity generation:
Why policy needs to look beyond costs. Energy Economics 32: 796–804.
Hall S, et al. (2015) Investing in low-carbon transitions: energy ﬁnance as an adaptive market. Climate
Policy DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2015.1094731.
Hall S, et al. (in press) Financing the Civic Energy Sector: How ﬁnancial institutions aﬀect ownership
models in Germany and the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science.
Hamilton K (2009) Unlocking ﬁnance for clean energy: The need for ‘investment grade’ policy.
Chatham house brieﬁng paper EERG BP 2009/06.
Heide D, Greiner M, von Bremen L, et al. (2011) Reduced storage and balancing needs in a fully
renewable European power system with excess wind and solar power generation. Renewable Energy
36: 2515–2523.
Helm D (2003) Energy, the State, and the Market: British Energy Policy Since 1979. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Helm D (2013) British infrastructure policy and the gradual return of the state. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 29: 287–306.
Hoogma R, Kemp R, Schot J, et al. (2002) Experimenting for Sustainable Transport: The Approach of
Strategic Niche Management. London: Spoon Press.
Hughes T (1983) Networks of Power: Electriﬁcation in Western Society, 1880–1930. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Infrastructure UK (2013) National Infrastructure Plan 2013. Part of UK Government Autumn
Statement 2013. London: UK Treasury.
Karltorp K and Sande´n BA (2012) Explaining regime destabilisation in the pulp and paper industry.
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 2: 66–81.
Keay M (2012) Death by a Thousand Regulations: The New Energy Bill. Oxford: Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies.
Kemp R, Schot J and Hoogma R (1998) Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche
formation: The approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management 10: 175–198.
Kern F (2012) The development of the CCGT and the ‘dash for gas’ in the UK power industry (1987–
2000). Final case study report as part of work package 2 of the UKERC project: ‘CCS – Realising the
potential?’. London: UK Energy Research Centre.
Knight FH (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt. Boston and New York: Kelley.
Meadowcroft J (2009) What about the politics? Sustainable development, transition management, and
long term energy transitions. Policy Sciences 42: 323–340.
Mitchell C (2008) The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Mitchell C (2014) Britain’s dinosaur capacity market will worsen energy ‘trilemma’. IGov, University
of Exeter. Available at: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/britains-dinosaur-capacity-market-will-
worsen-energy-trilemma/ (accessed 15 November 2015).
Bolton et al. 1401
Mitchell C, Bauknecht D and Connor PM (2006) Eﬀectiveness through risk reduction: A comparison
of the renewable obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany. Energy
Policy 34: 297–305.
Nelson D and Pierpont B (2013) The Challenge of Institutional Investment in Renewable Energy. San
Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative.
O’Malley P (ed.) (2005) Governing Risks. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Ottosson M and Magnusson T (2013) Socio-technical regimes and heterogeneous capabilities: The
Swedish pulp and paper industry’s response to energy policies. Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management 25: 355–368.
Pollitt MG and Haney AB (2013) Dismantling a competitive electricity sector: The U.K.’s electricity
market reform. The Electricity Journal 26: 8–15.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2010) Meeting the 2020 Renewable Energy Targets: Filling the
Oﬀshore Wind Financing Gap. London: PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Rasmussen MG, Andresen GB and Greiner M (2012) Storage and balancing synergies in a fully or
highly renewable pan-European power system. Energy Policy 51: 642–651.
Redpoint (2010) Electricity market reform, analysis of policy options. Redpoint in association with
Trilemma.
Rhodes C (2013) Infrastructure Policy. London: House of Commons Library.
Smink MM, Hekkert MP and Negro SO (2015) Keeping sustainable innovation on a leash? Exploring
incumbents’ institutional strategies. Business Strategy and the Environment 24: 86–101.
Smith A, Stirling A and Berkhout F (2005) The governance of sustainable socio-technical transitions.
Research Policy 34: 1491–1510.
Stenzel T and Frenzel A (2008) Regulating technological change: The strategic reactions of utility
companies towards subsidy policies in the German, Spanish and UK electricity markets. Energy
Policy 36: 2645–2657.
Steward F (2012) Transformative innovation policy to meet the challenge of climate change:
Sociotechnical networks aligned with consumption and end-use as new transition arenas for a
low-carbon society or green economy. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 24: 331–343.
Sullivan R (2011) Investment-grade climate change policy: Financing the transition to the low-carbon
economy. Report for Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), the Investor
Network on Climate Risk (INCR), the Investor Group on Climate Change Australia/New
Zealand (IGCC) and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI).
Thomas S (2006) The grin of the Cheshire cat. Energy Policy 34: 1974–1983.
Turnheim B and Geels F (2013) The destabilisation of existing regimes: Confronting a multi-
dimensional framework with a case study of the British coal industry (1913–1967). Research
Policy 42: 1749–1767.
UBS (2011) An Introduction to Infrastructure as an Asset Class. New York: UBS Global Asset
Management.
Unruh GC (2000) Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy 28: 817–830.
Waissbein O, Glemarec Y, Bayraktar H, et al. (2013) Derisking Renewable Energy Investment: A
Framework to Support Policymakers in Selecting Public Instruments to Promote Renewable Energy
Investment in Developing Countries. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
Webb J (2014) Evaluating urban energy systems in the UK: The implications for ﬁnancing heat
networks. Science and Technology Studies 27: 47–67.
Wigley B, Cameron J, Ferguson M, et al. (2010) Unlocking investment to deliver Britain’s low carbon
future. Report by the Green Investment Bank Commission.
Williamson O (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Winskel M (2002) When systems are overthrown: The ‘dash for gas’ in the British electricity supply
industry. Social Studies of Science 32: 563–598.
Winskel M and Radcliﬀe J (2014) The rise of accelerated energy innovation and its implications for
sustainable innovation studies: A UK perspective. Science and Technology Studies 27: 8–33.
1402 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 34(8)
Woodman B and Mitchell C (2011) Learning from experience? The development of the renewables
obligation in England and Wales 2002–2010. Energy Policy 39: 3914–3921.
Zachmann G (2007) A Markov switching model of the merit order to compare British and German
price formation. Discussion papers, German Institute for Economic Research.
Ronan Bolton is Lecturer in Science, Technology and Innovation Studies at the University of
Edinburgh. His work examines the interconnected policy, market and regulatory challenges
of transforming carbon based energy systems and enabling the development of lower carbon
energy infrastructure.
Timothy J Foxon is Professor of Sustainability Transitions (SPRU – Science Policy Research
Unit, The Sussex Energy Group). He is a leading expert of innovation systems and processes
for a transition to a low carbon economy.
Stephen Hall is a postdoctoral research fellow in low-carbon energy futures at the
Sustainability Research Institute, University of Leeds. His research is focuses on the
technological, ﬁnancial and governance challenges of transitioning to sustainable energy
systems.
Appendix – list of interviews
(1) Head of sustainability at a large investment fund. 14 January 2013
(2) Head of renewables policy at a major UK energy utility. 15 January 2013
(3) Company secretary of an energy cooperative. 25 January 2013
(4) Managing director of energy innovation at a major UK energy utility. 24 January 2013
(5) Head of advisory at a specialist environmental investment group. 4 February 2013
(6) Partner at an advisory ﬁrm specialising in private equity and infrastructure
investments. 4 February 2013
(7) Co-founder and director of an investment company specialising in small scale
renewables. 5 February 2013
(8) Partner and head of sustainability research at an investment group specialising in
sustainability. 6 February 2013
(9) Investment director at a European investment fund specialising in energy, climate
change and infrastructure. 25 February 2013
(10) Individual renewable energy project developer. 28 February 2013
(11) CEO of a NGO which campaigns for sustainable investment practices in the pensions
sector. 6 February 2013
(12) CEO of an investment industry professional body promoting sustainable investment
practices. 4 April 2013
(13) Senior member of the commercial department of a major UK energy utility. 5 April
2013
(14) Employee in the investor relations team of an energy related government agency. 14
June 2013
(15) Senior civil servant working on renewable deployment. 9 August 2013
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